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Restrictiveness and 
International Transmission of 
the “New” Protectionism 
Carl B. Hamilton 
8.1 Introduction 
Developed countries on both sides of the Atlantic use nontariff trade 
barriers (NTBs) extensively to restrict imports from new competitors 
in manufacturing production. While these protectionist measures are 
frequently cited as one of the most serious threats to the international 
trading system, comparatively little is known about how restrictive 
they actually are and about how they affect trading patterns, prices, 
and expectations. * This paper estimates the restrictiveness of a subset 
of NTBs and then considers their effects on the trade pattern of North 
Atlantic developed countries (NADCs). 
One reason for the lack of knowledge about NTBs is that they seem 
politically attractive precisely because they are difficult to identify, not 
transparent, and hard to evaluate.2 Sometimes there is no official in- 
formation on an NTB. In cases where information does exist, it is not 
always found classified under foreign trade. Examples are the (illegal)3 
industry-to-industry export restraint agreements between the footwear 
industries in the United Kingdom or France and South Korea, and the 
regulations in many countries on sanitary, hygienic, and phytosanitary 
standards and packing requirements for food imports. 
Carl B. Hamilton is with the Institute for International Economic Studies a t  Stockholm 
University, Sweden. 
The author has benefited from the comments of Robert Baldwin and colleagues at the 
Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm, above all, Harry Flam and Nils 
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Even knowing that an NTB exists tells us little about its restrictive- 
ness. NTBs mentioned in official publications may prevent all imports, 
or may be used only occasionally, or the NTB may not be upheld at 
all by the authorities. For example, an import quota may never be 
filled, either because demand is low, or because other trade restrictions 
cause the quota to be underutilized. There is a Norwegian license 
requirement for import of Taiwanese footwear, for example, but licen- 
ses are never given. In the early 1980s, European quotas on certain 
textiles and clothing products were not binding for a period. The French 
footwear quotas against Taiwan have been much larger than the actual 
import volume for several years Finally, regulations in bilateral 
trade agreements that limit exporters’ ability to substitute between 
narrowly defined commodity categories and to carry over and carry 
forward underutilized quotas between periods can make full utilization 
of quotas extremely difficult.5 
This paper measures the restrictiveness of one of the most important 
types of NTBs, Voluntary Export Restraints (VERs), applied to textiles 
and clothing, the commodity groups where the bulk of today’s VERs 
are found.6 Exports of textiles and clothing in 1984 constituted 9 percent 
of world trade in manufactures and 25 percent of developing areas’ 
manufactured exports to industrial areas. Of these developing areas’ 
exports, clothing amounted to 19 percentage points.’ The “Big Three” 
developing-country exporters (Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea) 
captured 60 percent of the U.S. import market for clothing in 1982, 
with Hong Kong’s share 24 percentage points. In Europe, the Big Three 
are much smaller suppliers. They supplied 32 percent of the EC import 
market for clothing (excluding EC intra-trade), with Hong Kong fur- 
nishing over half of this amount, 18 percentage points.8 Thus, by es- 
timating the restrictiveness of VERs applied to the Big Three’s clothing 
exports, one can learn much about how world trade in manufactures 
and total developing-country exports of manufactures are affected by 
VERs. 
8.2 Restrictiveness of VERs applied to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and 
South Korea 
In a previous paper (Hamilton 1986a), I investigated the restrictive- 
ness of VERs on clothing exported from Hong Kong to the United 
States and to several European countries. I estimated the import-tariff 
equivalents (MTEs) on the basis of prices registered on the market for 
export-quota rights in Hong Kong and found that these rates were high, 
that they fluctuated considerably over time, and that they differed 
between Europe and the United States. In this paper I use two ap- 
proaches to broaden the estimates of the restrictiveness of VERs to 
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include clothing exported from the other two members of the Big Three, 
Taiwan and South Korea. 
8.2.1 Approach I: Direct Measurement 
For Taiwan, official monthly prices for trade in export-quota rights 
were collected from 1980 to 1983. Officially, no quota trade was allowed 
during this period unless it was undertaken through the Taiwan Textile 
Federation (TTF). When an exporter traded export-quota rights through 
the TTF, the transaction and the price of the quota were registered. 
However, since the TTF is a quasi-public body, the recorded revenue 
was clearly visible to the tax authorities. For this reason, the TTF’s 
officially reported quota prices are generally regarded as below the 
prices of quota traded “under the table.” In practice, the Taiwanese 
authorities also permitted under-the-table quota trade. 
After the beginning of 1984, the TTF no longer registered quota 
prices; the data on prices paid for quotas were gathered from the Chinese- 
language magazine Quota Weekly. Unfortunately, price data from Quota 
Weekly are available only for the first half of 1984.9 The information 
collected from the TTF and Quota Weekly was used to calculate import- 
tariff equivalent rates for clothing exported from Taiwan to the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. lo 
To be able to uphold their VER agreements under the Multifiber 
Arrangement (MFA), the United States and the European Community 
produce special trade statistics in which textiles and clothing products 
are classified in a large number of subcategories. These special trade 
statistics were used to calculate import unit values for European coun- 
tries and unit values for exports to the United States, which then served 
as proxies for the rent-inclusive import and export prices.” The Hong 
Kong and Taiwanese quota prices were given in Hong Kong dollars 
and New Taiwanese dollars, by category, importing country, and time 
period. The quota prices (rents) and proxies for the rent-inclusive im- 
port prices could then be used to calculate half-yearly import-tariff 
equivalents of the Community’s VER agreements with Hong Kong, 
and monthly export-tax equivalents for both the United States’ agree- 
ments with Hong Kong and Taiwan. For the Community’s trade with 
Taiwan, monthly import-tariff equivalents were calculated. In table 8.2 
below, only yearly averages are given.’* 
8.2.2 Approach 11: Indirect Measurement 
A simple framework can be used to show how to derive the MTE 
rate of one exporting country from the known MTE rate of another 
exporting country. Let tjm be the ad valorem tariff rate on product j 
exported from country x to importing country m ,  and let uj”“ be the 
ad valorem import-tariff equivalent of a VER on product j exported 
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from country x to country m. Since only a single commodity is being 
considered, the subscript j is dropped here. The volume of exports 
from x to m is ex" 2 0. When exports are restricted by VERs, there 
is an upper limit, ex" 5 e-xm. Under these conditions, traders will ex- 
tract the import-tariff equivalent of the VERs so as to maximize their 
profits. Assuming perfect competition in the market for rights to export, 
in equilibrium the zero-profit condition requires that 
(1) 
and 
(2) 
where pm is the domestic price in country m and p x  the domestic price 
in country x. It is assumed that circular trade is not profitable. Pro- 
duction in the importing country is assumed to be positive with do- 
mestic output being a perfect substitute in consumption for imports. 
When the constraint on the traded volume is binding and trade is pos- 
itive, 0 < ex" = er", the relationship betweenp andpm can be written 
(3) 
Suppose we know the MTE rate for exporting country x, that is, 
uxm. Is it possible from this piece of information to derive the MTE 
rate of another country exporting commodityj to the same market, m? 
This would be very useful, since it is normally difficult to measure MTE 
rates, and even impossible when export quotas are allocated entirely 
in an administrative way, e.g., through government regulation. In par- 
ticular, can the Hong Kong MTE rates be used to derive the implicit 
MTE rates of the South Korean government's export-quota allocation 
system, as well as to derive an alternative estimate of Taiwan's MTE 
rates from those based on the TTF's and Quota Weekly's quota prices? 
Such a derivation would be especially useful with South Korea, the 
second-largest exporter of clothing among the developing countries, 
because it was not possible to collect quota prices directly from South 
Korea. I 3  
In the cases studied here it can be assumed that the differences in 
the transportation costs for the exports of the three exporting countries 
to their common destinations are insignificant. Writing out equation (3) 
for the trade of two exporting countries, k and h, with importing country 
m yields 
[ p" - p"(l + uxm)(l + txm)]exm = 0 for exm = e-xm 
[ p" - p(l + fxm)]exm = 0 for exm 5 e-xm, 
p"(1 + u"")(l + t"") = p". 
(4) 
and 
( 5 )  
p k ( 1  + uk")(l + tk") = p", 
py1 + uh")(l + fh") = p". 
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Combining the two expressions, remembering that one of the MTE 
rates, uhm, say, is known and that tariff rates can be obtained from 
official publications, that is, thm and tkm are known, one can write the 
following expression for country k’s MTE rate: 
(6) 
The crucial information concerns the relationship between the supply 
prices in the two exporting countries. If they are equal, the estimation 
is straightforward. Furthermore, if one knows that the supply price in 
country k is no higher than that of country h, that is, pk I ph, then (6) 
yields a lower-bound estimate of country k’s MTE rate. To be on the 
conservative side, the aim here is for such lower-bound estimates. 
First, however, the possibility of quality differences among the three 
countries’ clothing exports needs to be considered. To a large extent, 
quality differences are reflected in the Big Three’s export mixes of 
MFA categories. These differences are taken into account in the cal- 
culations. For example, the fact that the export mixes of Taiwan and 
South Korea contain larger shares of high-tariff MFA categories ex- 
plains the comparatively higher U.S. tariffs on exports from these two 
countries. Furthermore, quantitative restrictions stimulate profit- 
maximizing exporters to “upgrade” the quality of their restricted-export 
volume, and this tends to reduce quality differences within each com- 
modity category. This means that exporters in the Big Three, all of 
which are mature clothing-exporting developing countries, will be found 
in the higher-quality segment within each MFA category. Thus, while 
there are quality differences among developing-country producers in 
general, in the exports of the Big Three as modelled in this paper, they 
are assumed to be insignificant. 
Estimates of the unit cost of production are useful proxies for do- 
mestic prices in equation (6). What information can be derived from 
existing studies of unit costs of clothing production in general, and for 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea in particular? Clearly, labor 
costs are an important cost component and probably the one that varies 
most among countries. “Labor costs in the apparel industry still rep- 
resent 20 to 40 percent of the sales turnover [compared with 8 to 20 
percent in modern textile plants, and] the required investment per 
employee in the apparel industry does not exceed $15,000, so obviously 
the hourly wage differences between one country and another are of 
significant importance in the apparel ind~stry.”’~ Table 8.1 presents 
hourly compensation data for production workers. Labor costs in Tai- 
wan were lower than in Hong Kong, and were lower still in South 
Korea. To reach the Hong Kong level, the hourly compensation figure 
would have had to increase by 20 percent in Taiwan and by 60 percent 
in South Korea. 
(1 + ukm) = [ p h ( l  + Uh“)(l + th”)]/pk(l + Pm). 
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Table 8.1 Labor Costs in Textile and Clothing Production 
Clothing Basic Textiles 
Hourly Compensation Hourly Labor Cost 
incl. SOC. Chargesh 
Average 1981-83 Winter 1985/86 
for Production Workers” 
Country US$ Index US$ Index 
Hong Kong 1.58 21 1.81 21 
Taiwan 1.32 18 1.60 18 
S. Korea 0.98 13 1.57 18 
Portugal 1.56= 21 1.27 15 
U.S.  7.38 100 8.67 100 
W. Germany 9.20 125 8.88 103 
U.K.  5.10 69 5.90 69 
France 6.46 88 7.44 86 
Italy 6.65 90 8.22 95 
Spain 4.09 55 3.54 41 
Sweden 9.15 124 9.61 111 
Japan 4.43 60 8.20 95 
Brazil 1.45 20 1.67 19 
Thailand 0.53 6 
China 0.20 2 
India 0.43d 6 0.61 7 
““Hourly compensation” consists of two parts: “hourly wage rates” and “additional 
compensation.” Source: U.S. Dept. of Labor Statistics, Office of Productivity and 
Technology. 
b‘‘Social charges” includes “other costs paid by operator” and “other costs paid by 
company.” Dollar figures based on exchange rates as of 15 January 1986. Source: Werner 
International Management Consultants, Brussels and New York. 
c1981 and 1982 only. 
d1981 only. 
By adjusting wage costs for differences in labor productivity, we can 
obtain unit labor costs. With regard to labor productivity in clothing 
production, the comment is frequently made that the NICs as a group 
have caught up, or almost caught up, with labor productivity levels in 
developed countries. “From 1972 to 1982 productivity levels [in the 
group of newly industrialized countries, the NICsl almost reached those 
of the industrialized countries,”15 where the NICs are defined to include 
Hong Kong, Taiwan, Portugal, and South Korea. “[High and rising 
productivity in industrialized countries] is probably not an effective 
counter to low wage costs in the clothing industry since the skills are, 
generally, easily acquired, and the machinery available-especially for 
sewing-is not exceptionally sophisticated. Studies of clothing indus- 
tries in various locations in poor countries have shown the number of 
pieces produced per hour to be not much lower-or even higher-than 
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in Europe, the United States, or Japan.”l6 The U.S. International Trade 
Commission, in a 1985 study of emerging textile-exporting countries, 
considered the Big Three as having approximately the same labor 
productivity. 
Capital costs, the other main cost component, are small in clothing 
as compared with most other industries. Capital costs are not subsi- 
dized in Hong Kong, and government-subsidized loans to apparel pro- 
duction for export in South Korea have been comparatively small.18 
Taiwan also has not pursued a policy of subsidizing capital costs. 
Thus, we may conclude that Taiwanese and South Korean wages in 
the clothing sector, if anything, are below those in Hong Kong; that 
labor productivity is approximately the same in Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
and South Korea; and that unit costs are slightly lower in Taiwan and 
South Korea than in Hong Kong. Consequently, from Hong Kong data 
one can derive lower-bound estimates of the MTE rates and VER rents 
in Korean and Taiwanese clothing exports to the United States, West 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Community. 
Table 8.2 presents the directly and indirectly estimated MTE rates. 
U.S. tariffs are higher than those of the EC. The difference is accounted 
for in part by the fact that the U.S. tariff is levied on the (rent-inclusive) 
export price when the goods have been delivered free on board (f.0.b.) 
in the exporting country, while the EC tariff is levied on the (rent- 
inclusive) import price that includes handling costs, insurance, and 
freight costs (c.i.f.). l 9  As expected, the TTF-based MTE rates are lower 
than the Quota Weekly figures, although the time periods do not overlap 
exactly, and they are also lower than the lower-bound MTE rates de- 
rived from Hong Kong data. 
8.2.3 
We know that VERs transfer the rent from protection to the exporting 
country. Knowing these MTE rates, as well as the volumes traded, we 
can calculate the rent income transferred from the United States, West 
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the European Community to Hong 
Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea. These estimates are presented in 
table 8.3. However, it should be stressed that the rents of Taiwan and 
South Korea are lower-bound estimates. The rents to Hong Kong are 
considerably larger than those of Taiwan and Korea. Rents from ex- 
ports to the United States constitute around 80 percent of the total 
rent from Europe and the United States in 1982-83. The higher U.S. 
rent transfer can be explained partly by the strong U.S. domestic de- 
mand in 1982-83 as compared with that in Western Europe. Since 
European demand was weaker, European VERs were less restrictive, 
and thus rents transferred were smaller. (For Hong Kong, the total rent 
income was about 1 percent of GNP in 1982-83.) 
Estimates of VER Rents to the Big Three 
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Table 8.2 Trade Barriers against Clothing Imported from Hong Kong, 
Taiwan, and South Korea by North Atlantic Developed Countries 
(percent) 
Import-Tariff Equivalents 
Combined 
Tariff 1984 Trade 
Rate 1980 1981 1982 1983 1-5 Avg. Barrier 
U.S. :  
Hong Kong 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan, TTF 
Taiwan, QW 
Taiwan, hk 
Taiwan, hk 
Korea, hk 
Korea, hk 
West Germany: 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan, TTF 
Taiwan, hk 
Korea, hk 
U . K . :  
Hong Kong 
Taiwan, TTF 
Taiwan, hk 
Korea, hk 
France: 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan, hk 
Korea, hk 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan, hk 
Korea, hk 
EC-10: 
22 
27 
31 
31 
23 
31 
23 
30 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
37 
3 
25 
15 
8 
9 
5 
26 
8 
20 
15 
20 
7 
14 
13 
18 
21 
20 
18 
19 
16 
9 
5 
5 
4 
3 
6 
3 
2 
I I  
4 
5 
6 
12 
13 
14 
7 
4 
5 
37 
8 
19 
19 
1 1  
5 
6 
5 
7 
6 
4 
5 
7 
7 
6 
9 
5 
5 
47 
22 
8 
19 
7 
- 
28 
5 
- 
- 
12 
12 
- 
13 
7 
10 
7 
15 
7 
8 
8 
13 
14 
13 
14 
9 
9 
67 
64 
38 
60 
54 
47 
42 
45 
32 
25 
29 
25 
35 
25 
26 
26 
32 
33 
33 
33 
28 
27 
aTaiwanese MTEs are based on the TTF and the Quota Weekly (QW) quota prices, 
respectively. “hk” means derived from Hong Kong quota prices. The average figures 
for the Community countries’ import tariff equivalents for imports from Hong Kong are 
averages over a period stretching from the 3d quarter of 1980 to the 1st quarter of 1984. 
The corresponding average for the United States is from January of 1982 to May of 1984. 
The yearly MTE rates for the European Community are averages. “1984, 1-5” means 
January to May of 1984. Concerning the United States, the figures relating to Hong Kong 
in 1980 (and the rents presented in table 8.3) are calculated from the data in M. Morkre, 
Import Quorus on Textiles, Bureau of Economics Staff Report to the Federal Trade 
Commission, August 1984, Washington, D.C. Morkre’s data cover a small set of MFA 
categories having a lower tariff rate (import-value-weighted) than my own set of com- 
modities of later years. 
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Table 8.3 Rent Income to Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea from 
Voluntary Export Restraints on Clothing Exports (millions of U.S. 
dollars, 1985 prices) 
Country 
Total 
1980 1981 I982 1983 1982-83 
U.S. :  
Hong Kong 
Taiwan, TTF 
Taiwan, hk 
Korea, hk 
Total U.S.: 
West Germany: 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan, TTF 
Taiwan, hk 
S. Korea, hk 
Frunce: 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan, hk 
S. Korea, hk 
Total France: 
United Kingdom: 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan, TTF 
Taiwan, hk 
S. Korea, hk 
Total U.K.: 
Total Germany: 
EC-10: 
Hong Kong 
Taiwan, hk 
S. Korea, hk 
Total EC-10: 
Total U.S.  and EC-10: 
218 
29 36 
54 
37 
87 
13 10 
22 
27 
3 
1 
7 
72 
6 5 
8 
18 
189 
39 
75 
I29 
46 
48 
52 
20 
7 
3 
3 
2 
0 
5 
37 
2 
3 
8 
73 
7 
21 
423 
69 
164 
93 
37 
5 
6 
6 
1 
0 
1 
25 
3 
2 
4 
76 
9 
16 
552 
115 
212 
I45 
812-909 
57 
12 
9 
9 
78 
62 
5 
5 
12 
79 
I49 
16 
37 
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The considerable variation in rents over the business cycle points to 
a problem associated with the recent U.S. suggestions that the gov- 
ernment should retain the rent from its import protection by auctioning 
import rights and then use this revenue to subsidize the adjustment of 
labor and capital to changed comparative cost conditions.20 Govern- 
ment subsidies to increase labor mobility and retrain labor are usually 
preferable to import barriers, and these subsidies would be needed 
most in times of recession. However, the auction-financed revenue 
would be at its lowest in a recession and at its highest in a boom. For 
the system to work, one would have to transfer revenues obtained from 
quota auctions in boom periods to recession periods. 
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8.3 Effects of NTBs on the Cross-Atlantic Trade Pattern 
8.3.1 Theory 
The tariffs of the United States, Canada, and the Western European 
countries (here defined as the EC and EFTA combined) on imports of 
manufactured goods are levied against all countries. But when it comes 
to NTB’s, the situation is quite different. The United States, Canada, 
and Europe-the North Atlantic developed countr ies40 not apply 
NTBs against manufactured imports from each other (except for steel), 
whereas they often apply NTBs against “sensitive” manufactured im- 
ports (textiles, clothing, and footwear) from the rest of the world. The 
United States, Canada, and Europe constitute a North Atlantic trade 
area free of internal NTBs on manufactures.21 For a given “sensitive” 
commodity, the NADCs do not necessarily apply NTBs to all countries 
in the rest of the world, or to the same set of exporters. 
For important manufactured exports from less developed countries 
(LDCs), the set of restricted LDCs is fairly similar; for example, in 
textiles and clothing, the restricted LDCs are basically the MFA sig- 
natories plus Taiwan. For the U.S. and European footwear industries 
between 1977 and 1985, the restricted group was Brazil, South Korea, 
and Taiwan. 
The NADCs’ practice of maintaining only tariffs against each other 
while simultaneously also imposing NTBs against the rest of the world 
gives rise to an interdependence between the trade policy measures of 
these countries. This can be illustrated in the following analysis where 
only two NADC trading partners are considered, Europe (country e) 
and the United States (country s). Two cases can be distinguished that 
depend on whether both or only one of these countries use NTBs to 
restrict imports from the rest of the world. (Each imposes tariffs against 
the other and the rest of the world.) 
Case I :  Both the United States and Europe employ NTBs to restrict 
imports from all countries except each other. 
Consider the situation facing European producers of the NTB-restricted 
commodity. They can sell either in Europe at the European domestic price, 
p e ,  or they can sell in the United States. If they sell in the U.S. they face 
the U.S. (ad valorem) tariff barrier for the commodity, 1 + Ips, and they 
must cover transport cost, insurance costs, etc.22 The Europe-to-U.S. 
transport and insurance costs are here expressed in ad valorem terms as 
1 + zes. Denoting total European output by qe, the volume exported to 
the United States by qes, and the domestic U.S. price by p” ,  one of the 
following two expressions will hold on the margin: 
(7) pe( l  + t p s ) ( l  + zys) = p s  for 0 < q‘” 
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(8) 
The first expression states that for Europe-to-U.S. trade to take place 
the domestic U.S. price equals the combination of the domestic Eu- 
ropean price, the U.S. tariff, and the transport costs. If not, equation 
(8) holds; that is, there will be no trade. From (3) the equations for 
domestic prices in Europe and the United States can be written as: 
(9) p' = p* ( 1  + rxe)(l + uXy) 
pe(l  + r'")(l + zr") > p s  for 0 = qe" 
p y  = p"(l + t*")(l + u*s), 
where p x  is the domestic price in the rest of the world. Assuming that 
Europe-to-U.S. trade takes place, i.e., (7) holds, and inserting (9) and 
(10) into (7), we can then write: 
( 1  1 )  
If one ignores existing tariff preferences, and assumes that Europe 
and the rest of the world face the same tariff in the United States, this 
expression reduces to (12). The assumption of identical tariffs faced 
by European and rest-of-the-world suppliers in the United States is 
likely to hold for commodities subject to NTBs. Typically, tariff pref- 
erences on "sensitive" commodities are minimal in the United States 
and Europe. 
(12) 1 + ux" = ( 1  + uxe)(l + rxe) (1 + Z-). 
Equation (12) states that where there is Europe-to-U.S. trade, an 
increase in the restrictiveness of U.S. NTBs will cause prices to rise 
in Europe. Suppose import quotas are reduced, or rules of origin for 
countries in the rest of the world are changed in order to restrict im- 
ports. If  introduced by the United States, such policy changes would 
increase the U.S. MTE rate, uXs, and raise the domestic U.S. price. 
This in turn would lead to increased imports from unrestricted Euro- 
pean producers. Since in case 1 imports into Europe are assumed to 
be fixed because of European NTBs, the increased exports from Europe 
to the United States would reduce overall supply in Europe, and con- 
sequently increase the domestic price in Europe. To achieve a given 
percentage increase in the U.S. price by increasing the restrictiveness 
of U.S. NTBs, U.S. imports from the rest of the world must be reduced 
by a larger volume than would be the case without interdependence 
between the United States' NTB policy and European exports to the 
United States. In other words, the more restrictive U.S. NTB must 
reduce the overall supply in the combined NADC market to raise the 
domestic price in the United States. 
p*(l + rxe)(l + uxe)(l + te")(l + zes) = px( l  + tx")(l + uxs). 
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Case 1 is illustrated in figure 8.1,  which depicts the supply and de- 
mand curves of the two countries, "Europe" and "U.S.A.," and the 
European export supply curve, S'". The world market price is p x ,  and 
is assumed to be constant (this is discussed later). The domestic Eu- 
ropean price is above the world market price at  pg because imports 
from the non-NADCs-"the rest of the world"-are restricted to aOa,,  
so that domestic supply in Europe is Oao. U.S. producers sell at  home 
at the price of pb, which in the figure is assumed to be above the 
European domestic price even if European tariff and transport costs 
are zero. At price p8, the domestic U.S. supply is Obo and imports are 
bob,. Assuming that the higher U.S. domestic price is not high enough 
to cover the tariff and transport costs that Europeans face when selling 
in the U.S. market, all imports originate in the rest of the world. 
When the U.S. government decides to reduce imports from the rest 
of the world, the U.S. domestic price increases from pb tops  and U.S. 
production increases from Obo to Ob3. This has no effect on trade with 
Europe. However, suppose the U.S. government reduces imports from 
the rest of the world even further, to b2b5. Trade deflection is prevented 
in the real world by rules of origin. Consequently, such rules are as- 
sumed here to prevent European importers from buying from the rest 
of the world and reselling such goods in the United States. In this case, 
the U.S. domestic price reaches the level at which European producers 
find it profitable to sell in the United States, in other words, at  the 
price pg(1 + rJS) ( 1  + zp"). When this price is reached, the U.S. market 
supply curve kinks at t .  Beyond C the combined US.-European supply 
curve is SS+'". The U.S. price increases tops, U.S. domestic production 
increases to Ob4, and European production sold in the U.S. is b4b2. 
European production and price increase to Oa4 and p ~ ,  respectively, 
and European consumption is reduced to Oa3. The European exports 
to the United States are the result of both an increase in European 
production and a decrease in European consumption. 
Case 2: Only one of the two NADC partners maintains an NTB against 
the rest of the world on the commodity in question. Suppose Europe 
protects itself only with an ad valorem tariff and that the European 
tariff is lower than the combined tariff equivalent of the U.S. tariff and 
the U.S. NTB. (Otherwise the trade flow would be reversed.) The 
European domestic price is pg = px(l + txe) ,  and again making the 
simplifying assumption that re" = tx,', (12) can be rewritten as, 
(13) (1 + t"')(l + ZP") = ( 1  + u x s ) .  
Equation (13) states that, when trade takes place, there is an upper 
limit on the restrictiveness of the U S .  NTB that is determined by the 
European tariff rate against the rest of the world and by cross-Atlantic 
W
 
a
 
0
 
a: 
-
 
d
 
w
 
- Y wo
 
Q
 
3
 - n 10 n (u n t to 0 n n n 0 3 - 0 10 0 t 0 0 0 0 
212 Carl B. Hamilton 
transport costs. In the extreme case, European producers will export 
their entire output to the United States while the European market will 
be served exclusively by imports from the rest of the world. If the 
United States (or in the reverse case, Europe) wants to prevent its 
NADC partner from increasing exports as it tightens NTBs against the 
rest of the world, it must also introduce an NTB on imports on cross- 
Atlantic trade. 
Figure 8.2 illustrates case 2. At the world market price of p" and a 
tariff equal to pi; px, Europe imports aOal from the rest of the world. 
Suppose again that the U.S. government decides to reduce imports 
from the rest of the world. Considering a U.S.-to-Europe transmission 
of protection, one can distinguish among three policy intervals. 
Interval I: No policy transmission. As long as the U.S. domestic price 
increase resulting from the tighter NTB is kept below the European 
supply price, pi;(l + re")( 1 + zes),  the increase in U.S. domestic supply 
and the effect on U.S. consumers and producers is determined by the 
U.S. supply curve only (along k t ) .  Exporting from Europe does not 
take place, that is, qeT = 0, and p' < p6(1 + tes)(l + zrs).  
Interval 11: Complete policy transmission. Suppose U.S. imports from 
the rest of the world are reduced further. The U.S. domestic price reaches 
the supply price of imports from Europe, so that the supply curve kinks 
at 4 and is horizontal up to m. Imports to Europe from the rest of the 
world increase by the same amount as European exports to the United 
States, an amount shown by the segment ern on s J + y s .  U.S. production 
remains unchanged at Obz. Within Europe, domestic producers now sup- 
ply less than Oa,, the difference between Oa, and the Europeans' supply 
of European home demand being exported to the U.S.A. In this situa- 
tion, qeT 5 46, where q6 is the initial level of European production (Oao 
in the figure), andp. = ~ $ 1  + tes)(l + zes). 
Interval 111: Modijied policy transmission. If U.S. imports from the 
rest of the world are reduced even further, the point m is reached where 
Ss+es kinks upward and intersects with the U.S. domestic demand curve 
at n. The U.S. price increases to p f ;  U.S. consumption falls; U.S. 
production increases to Ob3; and imports from Europe increase beyond 
the initial European production volume of Oa, to Oaz, since the price 
of European output sold in the U.S. increases to pi. In Europe a wedge 
is driven between the export price received by producers and the im- 
port price pg paid by consumers. Since there is no European production 
for home demand, the European government could, in principle, dis- 
mantle its protection without affecting the price received by European 
producers, i.e., allow its consumers to enjoy the world market price 
p" while its producers sell at  the higher U.S. domestic price. 
If Europe imports its entire domestic demand from the rest of the 
world, would this drive up the world market price? No, because the 
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suppliers in the rest of the world can redirect the supply originally 
intended for the United States to Europe, and the combined U.S. and 
European demand from the rest of the world will remain unchanged 
(along em) or fall (beyond m). If anything, the world market price will 
fall. In this policy situation, qf, 
It is sometimes said that developed-country tariffs are no longer 
important. However, as cases 1 and 2 indicate, this view overlooks the 
(potential) interplay between one importing country’s NTBs and an- 
other importing country’s tariff levels. More specifically, it is not nec- 
essarily one country’s NTB combined with its tariff that determines its 
combined trade barrier on a product. 
Suppose both NADC partners initially maintain NTBs, but then one 
(say, Europe) liberalizes imports. Case 2 represents this situation. If 
Europe lowers its nontariff trade barriers, this stimulates European 
producers to look towards the United States, since that market becomes 
relatively more lucrative. Consequently, the U.S. domestic price is 
reduced. 
The EC-EFTA countries’ liberalization of textile and clothing im- 
ports from Spain and Portugal through the enlargement of the EC 
illustrates how reduced protection may also be transmitted to another 
country, namely, the United States. Portugal has a well-established, 
competitive textile and clothing industry, but presently faces quanti- 
tative restrictions (VERs) on its exports to the EC and EFTA coun- 
tries.23 Wage rates in Portuguese textile and clothing production are 
shown in table 8.1. They are not only below those of the United States 
and northern European countries, but are close to the levels of Hong 
Kong, South Korea, and Taiwan. These wage levels should give Por- 
tugal a competitive edge in Europe when the EC-EFTA VERs are 
removed in 1990. If, as would be expected, the European price on 
textiles and clothing then declined, other European suppliers would 
export to the United States. The case 2 mechanism would be put in 
motion, reducing the U.S. domestic price and production. No U.S. 
rules of origin that discriminate against textile and clothing exports 
q‘” and p6(1 + r(-) (1 + zc“) < p“. 
from Portugal could prevent SU&h an indirect trade deflection. 
8.3.2 Empirical Evidence 
Is it possible to observe such transmission effects on intra-NADC 
trade because of NTBs on “sensitive” commodities? Can NTBs be 
said to have caused larger cross-Atlantic trade flows than otherwise 
would have occurred? 
Ideally one would like to compare two sets of commodities: those 
subject to NADCs’ NTBs and those not subject to such NTBs, with 
both sets displaying the same shift in comparative advantage away from 
NADC producers to producers in the rest of the world. In practice, 
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the problem with such a comparison is that almost all developing- 
country manufacturing exports in which important shifts in compara- 
tive advantage have taken place are subject to NTBs. Thus, the set of 
commodities displaying the same shifts in location of production as the 
commodities where the bulk of NTBs are found is too limited to be 
useful as a “control” group. What I will use instead to indicate the 
effect of NTBs on trade flows is a comparison of changes in suppliers’ 
shares of home demand (apparent consumption), specifically: (a) do- 
mestic, (b) partner NADC, and (c) rest-of-the-world suppliers. 
Home demand of commodityj is defined as domestic production, Pi, 
plus imports, Mi, minus exports, Ej. The supply of home demand is 
then divided into the following three sources of origin (dropping the 
subscript j ): 
a. Domestic share of home demand (D):  D = ( P  - E)/C 
b. NADC countries’ share of home demand ( N  ): N = MNADCIC 
c. Rest-of-the-world’s share of home demand (X ): X = Mx/C 
In any one year, these shares sum to unity, with the change in the 
combined shares between any two years summing to zero. In the tra- 
ditional literature on customs unions, AN 2 0 implies gross trade cre- 
ation. However, the measure of gross trade creation does not tell whether 
AN 2 0 has been at  the expense of domestic supply (a shift from high- 
to low-cost suppliers) or rest-of-the-world supply (a shift from low- to 
higher-cost partner suppliers). To ascertain this, net trade creation is 
defined as AD 5 0. Furthermore, A X 5 0 is defined as trade diversion. 
If it is assumed that the NADCs have lost comparative advantage in 
a commodity, one would expect to find that, in the absence of NTBs 
against the rest of the world, there would be net trade creation, in other 
words, AD I 0, and an increase in the share of imports in home demand 
would come mainly from the rest-of-the-world suppliers. However, 
since it is known that NTBs in some instances have covered only part 
of a commodity category-for example, only certain types of foot- 
wear-and have not always covered all exporters, one should allow 
for the possibility of NTBs’ being “leaky” rather than “watertight.” 
Thus, the following hypotheses are formulated: In the absence of NTBs, 
and given the lower costs of the rest-of-the-world suppliers, one would 
expect AD < 0, AN < 0, and A X > 0. With NTBs one would expect 
AN 2 0, and, if the NTBs were “leaky,” one would expect that 
A X > AN, but still with AN > 0. Summarizing the hypotheses: 
In the absence of NTBs: AD < 0, AN < 0, and 0 < A X 
With “watertight” NTBs: AD 5 0 or 0 5 AD, 0 5 AN, and A X 5 0 
With ‘‘leaky’’ NTBs: AD 5 0, 0 < AN, and AN < A X  
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Five NADCs-the United States, West Germany, France, the United 
Kingdom, and Sweden-are studied, first separately and then as a 
combined group. Their shares in 1975 and 1983 are compared, and then 
also are compared to the U.S. shares for 1981 and 1983. The latter 
comparison is of interest because the U.S. dollar appreciated signifi- 
cantly between those two years (40 percent against the European Cur- 
rency Unit, ECU). 
Commodities are classified on the basis of the three-digit ISIC code. 
For the United States, four NTB-restricted commodity groups are stud- 
ied: textiles (ISIC 321), clothing (322), footwear (324), and basic iron 
and steel (371). This last group differs from the others in that there are 
NTBs between Europe and the United States (as well as subsidies, 
minimum-price rules, production quotas, etc.). However, the trade- 
restricting actions taken by the NADCs against each other in steel were 
designed to be in line with historical trade patterns. That is, the NTBs 
in steel tend to take the form of discrimination against the newly in- 
dustrialized countries. 
Table 8.4 indicates the share of U.S. domestic demand supplied by 
domestic producers, by exporters in other NADCs, and by the rest of 
Table 8.4 Shares of Apparent Consumption: the United States (percent)” 
Change Change 
Commodity 1975 1981 1983 1975-83 1981-83 
Textiles: 
Domestic 96.3 94.5 94.7 - 1.6 + 0.2 
NADCs 1.2 I .6 1.5 +0.3 -0.1 
ROW 2.5 4.0 3.8 + 1.3 -0.2 
Clothing: 
Domestic 90.2 81.6 79.7 - 10.5 - 1.9 
NADCs 1.2 1.2 1.5 +0.3 +0.3 
ROW 8.6 17.2 18.8 + 10.2 + 1.6 
Footwear: 
Domestic 76.2 67.8 56.7 - 19.5 -11 .1  
NADCs 9.4 8.0 9.6 +0.2  + 1.5 
ROW 14.4 24.2 33.8 + 19.3 + 9.6 
Steel: 
Domestic 90.4 86.1 87.1 -3.3 + 1.0 
NADCs 3.9 6.3 5.4 + 1.5 -0.9 
ROW 5.6 7.5 7.5 + 1.8 -0.1 
Source; Constructed from “The OECD Compatible Trade and Production Data Base 
1970-1980,” OECD Department of Economics and Statistics, Working Paper no. 31, 
March 1986, Paris. 
“NADC is North Atlantic developed countries and ROW is rest of the world. Figures 
have been rounded off. 
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the world between 1975 and 1983. For textiles, the changes in shares 
of home demand are small, and the hypothesis of “leaky” NTBs ap- 
pears to hold for the 1975-83 period. With clothing, there was much 
more net trade creation. With the rest of the world taking almost all 
of the reduced domestic share of home demand, the hypothesis again 
holds that NTBs were “leaky” yet produced some trade deflection. 
The net trade creation in footwear was almost twice as large as  in 
clothing-particularly so after 1981, when the U.S. restrictions on non- 
rubber footwear imports from Taiwan and South Korea were lifted. 
The “leaky”-NTBs hypothesis holds both for 1975-83 and for 1981 - 
83. 
Steel imports behaved similarly to textiles. Thus, over the period 
1975-83, there was net trade creation. NADC partners’ shares of U.S. 
home demand increased, but less than the increases from the rest of 
the world. U.S. NTBs were “leaky,” and permitted import penetration 
by the rest of the world, especially in clothing and footwear. The in- 
creases in NADC partners’ shares of U.S. home demand likely slowed 
down the observed increases in the rest of the world’s import pene- 
tration into the United States. 
Table 8.5 shows developments in France, West Germany, the United 
Kingdom (all of them members of the Community), and Sweden (a 
member of EFTA) in clothing and footwear trade. For these four Eu- 
ropean countries, the NADC group includes partners in EC and EFTA 
that have tariff-free access. There is net trade creation in all four coun- 
tries in both commodities. Apart from West Germany, the NADCs’ 
shares of home demand in clothing increased more than the shares of 
suppliers in the rest of the world. Consequently, the “leaky”-NTBs 
hypothesis does not hold for France, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. 
Sweden stands out as a country in which the partner share increased 
much more than the share of the rest of the world. With regard to 
footwear, all European countries experienced much faster growth in 
import penetration of NADC partners than in import share of the rest 
of the world. Overall, the net trade creation in Europe benefited NADC 
suppliers much more than in the United States, but domestic shares 
of home demand in clothing were lower in Europe than in the United 
States. 
Finally, in table 8.6 all NADCs are treated as a group (the United 
States, Canada, Belgium-Luxembourg, Finland, France, West Ger- 
many, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom). 
In addition to the four commodity groups mentioned above, a group 
of “all other manufactures” is included.24 Over the period, there was 
net trade creation in the “all other manufactures” category of minus 
3 percent; the rest of the world (which includes Japan25) accounted for 
just over half of that net trade creation. 
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Table 8.5 Shares of Apparent Consumption: France, West Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and Sweden (percent)’ 
Change 
1975 1983 ” 1975-83c 
France: 
Domestic 
NADCs 
ROW 
clothing 
footwear 
clothing 
footwear 
clothing 
footwear 
83.4 
11.3 
5.2 
66.9 
19.9 
13.3 
- 16.5 
+ 8.5 
+ 8.0 
Domestic 
NADCs 
ROW 
Germany: 
Domestic 
NADCs 
ROW 
83.2 
11.8 
5 .O 
66.5 
23.0 
10.5 
- 16.7 
+11.2 
+ 5.5 
55.1 
24.8 
20.1 
26.8 
35.1 
38.1 
-28.3 
+ 10.3 
+ 18.0 
Domestic 
NADCs 
ROW 
U.K.: 
Domestic 
NADCs 
ROW 
56.7 
34.6 
8.7 
38.9 
45.2 
15.9 
- 17.8 
+ 10.6 
i 7 . 2  
72.5 
11.5 
16.0 
60.0 
18.2 
21.8 
- 12.5 
+6.7 
+5.8 
Domestic 
NADCs 
ROW 
80.5 
10.4 
9. I 
64.0 
22. I 
13.9 
- 16.5 
+11.7 
+4.8 
Sweden: clothing 
footwear 
Domestic 
NADCs 
ROW 
38.0 
42.4 
19.7 
14.0 
55.9 
30.0 
- 24.0 
+ 13.6 
+ 10.4 
Domestic 
NADCs 
ROW 
36.1 
52.3 
11.6 
20.9 
63.1 
16.1 
- 15.3 
+ 10.8 
+ 4.4 
Source: Same as table 8.4. 
“NADCs is North Atlantic developed countries and ROW is rest of the world. Figures 
have been rounded off. 
”For Sweden 1981. 
‘For Sweden 1975 to 1981. 
Textiles display about the same changes as “all other manufactures.” 
Clothing and footwear, in contrast, had more net trade creation and 
the rest-of-the-world suppliers increased their shares of clothing and 
footwear relatively more than of textiles. In steel, there was little net 
trade creation and the increased import penetration was due entirely 
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Table 8.6 Shares of Apparent Consumption: North Atlantic Developed 
Countries (NADCs) Combined (percent). 
Change 
Commodity Source 1975 1983 1975 -83 
Textiles Domestic 83.9 80.6 -3.3 
NADCs 14.8 16.0 + 1.2 
ROW 1.3 3.4 +2.1 
Clothing Domestic 78.6 69.3 - 9.3 
NADCs 12.0 13.0 + 1.0 
ROW 9.4 17.7 +8.3 
Footwear Domestic 73. I 56.1 - 17.0 
NADCs 18.5 23.9 + 5.4 
ROW 8.4 20.0 +11.6 
Steel Domestic 85.0 84.5 -0.5 
NADCs 13.8 14.4 +0.6 
ROW 1.2 1.1 -0.1 
All other 
manufactures 
Domestic 82.9 79.9 -3.0 
NADCs 13.5 14.9 + 1.4 
ROW 3.6 5.2 + 1.6 
Source: Same as table 8.4 
“ROW is rest of the world. Figures have been rounded off. 
to NADC suppliers. There was even a slight trade-diversion effect 
against the rest of the world. 
In summary, net trade creation seems to have been much stronger 
in clothing and in footwear than in textiles, “all other manufactures,” 
and steel. In clothing and footwear, the NADCs’ partner penetration 
of home demand was larger than with “all other manufactures,” but 
smaller than the penetration of the rest-of-the-world suppliers. One 
interpretation of this is that, while NTB protection against the rest of 
the world has not been “watertight,” it has still generated increased 
intra-NADC trade in clothing, footwear, and 
Considering just textiles and clothing under the MFA, there are in- 
dications that there has been significant trade deflection since 1983. No 
doubt the United States became more restrictive in its bilateral agree- 
ments with developing MFA suppliers after 1982. The United States 
also changed its rules of origin for textiles and clothing so as to restrict 
imports. (Hong Kong and China were primarily affected by this.) In 
combination with the strong demand for imports in the United States, 
this policy is likely to be the major factor behind the widening gap 
between the growth of imports from restrained developing-country 
producers and from unrestrained West European suppliers. 
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From 1982 to 1985, imports of textiles and clothing processed from 
MFA fibers, originating in developing MFA suppliers, increased very 
slowly compared to imports from Western Europe. In 1985, such im- 
ports increased by a mere 4 percent, while imports from Western Eu- 
rope rose by 24 percent (see table 8.7). During the same period, the 
share of developing-country MFA suppliers in the United States’ im- 
ports of textiles and clothing processed from MFA fibers declined by 
4 percent, whereas the share of imports from Western Europe increased 
by 6 percent. But this is only part of the story: The United States’ 
policy also had the effect of boosting the import supply of clothing 
made of fibers nol covered by the MFA (linen, ramie, silk, and jute). 
Thus, non-MFA fiber clothing products increased from 80 million square 
yard equivalents (SYE, a volume measure used by the United States 
government) in 1983 to over 500 million SYE in 1985, or by almost 600 
percent. They now account for 10 percent of MFA clothing imports. 
These developments illustrate not only the trade-pattern effect of 
NTBs but also the effect on commodity composition. Because of NTBs, 
Western European producers have an incentive to supply the United 
States with certain types of restricted textiles and clothing, even though 
they may not have a comparative advantage in these commodity groups. 
(The same applies to their supply of the domestic MFA-protected Eu- 
ropean market, of course.) 
Table 8.7 United States Imports of Textiles and Clothing Processed from 
MFA Fibres from All Sources, from the Developing MFA 
Suppliers, and from Western Europe 
I982 I983 1984 1985 
Total imports 
Developing MFA suppliers 
Western Europe 
Total imports 
Developing MFA suppliers 
Western Europe 
Total imports 
Developing MFA suppliers 
Western Europe 
Billions of Square Yard Equivalent 
6.11 7.73 10.15 10.83 
3.73 4.55 5.98 6.22 
0.55 0.76 I .34 1.66 
Percentage Increase over  Previous Years 
27 32 7 
22 32 4 
38 76 24 
Percentage Share in Total Imports 
61.0 58.9 58.9 57.4 
9.0 9.8 13.2 15.3 
I00 100 100 100 
Sources: U .S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration TQ 2010, 
TQ 2210, TQ 2310 and Major Shippers Report. Table taken from International Textiles 
and Clothing Bureau, “Textile and Clothing: Developments in Industry, Technology, and 
Trade during MFA 111”. Geneva, 1986. 
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In the previous section, neither case 1 nor case 2 applies fully to the 
North Atlantic developed countries’ trade during the periods studied. 
On both sides of the Atlantic, the systems of VERs have ‘‘leaked’’ and 
have allowed increased import penetration, partly because VERs can- 
not cover new suppliers and new products, and partly because VERs 
were designed to permit some increases in imports. 
8.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The “new” forms of protectionism of the North Atlantic developed 
countries are frequently pointed to as a serious and growing problem 
for the world economy. However, surprisingly little is known about the 
extent and impact of that new protectionism on trade flows, prices, 
and welfare, especially in the exporting countries. 
The first part of this paper estimated the restrictiveness of, and rent 
income generated by, voluntary export restraints (VERs) on clothing 
exported in the early 1980s to the NADCs from the Big Three. Most 
VERs today are on clothing and textiles, and these two commodity 
groups account for almost 10 percent of world trade in manufactures 
and around 25 percent of developing-country manufactured exports to 
the NADCs. Exports to the NADCs are dominated by the Big Three, 
which make up almost two-thirds of the U.S. import market and one- 
third of the European import market. 
Restrictiveness was measured directly, and also indirectly by using 
estimates of the restrictiveness of one exporting country’s VERs to 
derive the restrictiveness of another exporting country’s VERs. The 
main findings were: ( 1 )  the combined tariffs and VERs of the United 
States in the early 1980s were higher than Europe’s; (2) the import- 
tariff equivalent (MTE) of the VERs varied with the business cycle in 
the importing NADCs; (3) the lower-bound MTE estimates for Taiwan 
and South Korea were lower than the rates of Hong Kong; and (4) the 
rent income transferred to the Big Three was substantial. It averaged 
at least half a billion U.S. dollars over the two-year period 1982-83, 
with around 80 percent of this total being transferred from the United 
States, and approximately two-thirds of the total rent going to Hong 
Kong. 
The second part of the paper investigated the implications of the fact 
that the NADCs do not apply nontariff barriers to imports from each 
other (with the notable exception of steel), whereas they do apply such 
barriers against the rest of the world. This has an overlooked impli- 
cation for the transmission of protectionist policies among the NADCs 
through indirect trade deflection. This mechanism operates to modify, 
or even nullify, the effects on the domestic economy of increased pro- 
tectionism against the rest of the world. It cannot be counteracted 
222 Carl B. Hamilton 
through rules of origin. Thus, the enlargement of the EC to include 
Portugal and Spain could have an important impact on the U.S.  gov- 
ernment’s ability to protect U.S. producers of clothing. 
The final section of the paper presented empirical evidence on the 
possible effect of nontariff barriers to trade on cross-Atlantic trade 
flows. Although rest-of-the-world suppliers of “sensitive” commodi- 
ties, like footwear and clothing, increased their shares of the NADCs’ 
home demand between 1975 and 1983, the shares of partners on the 
other side of the Atlantic also increased, pointing to the conclusion 
that NTBs have been “leaky.” 
Notes 
1.  A recent paper on the types and frequency of NTBs is by Nogues, OIe- 
chowski, and Winters (1986). 
2. Of course, the question of evaluation ought to  be a problem for the 
policymakers who constructed and introduced the measures, provided that the 
politicians’ objective has been to  restrict imports. However, this objective is 
not self-evident. See Yoffie (1983). 
3. The agreements violate the Community’s competition laws in addition t o  
the article of the Rome Treaty disallowing new national trade restrictions. 
4. Langhammer (1982) and Hamilton (1986a) and (1986b). 
5. Choi, Chung, and Marian (1985) and Yoffie (1983). 
6. The developed countries’ protection regarding textiles and clothing is 
formally legitimized within GATT through the Multifiber Arrangement (MFA). 
See, e.g., Wolf (1983) and Choi, Chung, and Marian (1985) for descriptions of 
the MFA. 
7. GATT (1985). 
8. GATT (1984). 
9. Publication of Quota Weekly ceased in mid-1984 after 18 months. 
10. One feature of the quota market in Taiwan is that there is trade both in 
rights to  export that are valid for the present year only (“temporary quotas”) 
and trade in rights t o  export that are valid for all future periods (“permanent 
quotas”). Unfortunately, the registered prices for “permanent quotas” either 
were almost constant over time-the data from the TTF, or contained too few 
observations to  be useful-the data from Quota Weekly. For a theoretical paper 
on intertemporal aspects of trade in quotas, see Anderson (1987). 
1 I .  It should be noted that, owing to the “upgrading effect” of VERs, there 
is a tendency within each commodity category for an exporting country to  
concentrate on  higher-quality and more costly grades (see Falvey 1979 and 
Feenstra 1984). This upgrading mechanism works toward a narrower range of 
quality differences within each commodity category than would have been the 
case, or could be expected to  be the case for unrestrained exports. 
12. Readers interested in the variations over time in import-tariff equivalent 
rates are  referred t o  Hamilton (1986a). Export trade statistics are not available 
on the MFA classifications. In table 8.2, the United States’ export-tax equiv- 
alents are  converted into import-tariff equivalents by exploiting the fact that 
ordinary U.S. import statistics-but not the MFA trade statistics-are given 
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on both a c.i.f. and an f.0.b. basis. The conversion was made by taking the 
ratio of c.i.f. and f.0.b. values on clothing imported from Hong Kong, which 
turned out to  be 1.07. On precise references to  statistical sources, and on the 
use of disaggregated unit values, see also Hamilton (1986a). 
13. I tried in vain to  collect quota prices for South Korea, also through 
Korean colleagues and research institutes. An indirect method seems to  be the 
only one possible since trade in quotas is strictly forbidden, and this law is 
enforced. See also Breitenacher, Galli, and Grefermann (1986,229). Also, apart 
from different intensities of policing, controls in South Korea are  more effective 
than they probably can ever be in Taiwan o r  in Hong Kong, as the bulk of 
Korea’s clothing trade is concentrated in a few large corporations, compared 
to a very large number of small firms in Taiwan and in Hong Kong. 
14. Werner International Management Consultants (1986). 
15. Breitenacher, Galli, and Grefermann (1986, 87). 
16. Cable and Baker (1983, 54). 
17. United States International Trade Commission (1985, 29-30). 
18. Hong (1981, table 8.19). Also, “[the] expansion of exports of textiles, 
wearing apparel, and miscellaneous manufactures can be attributed more to 
basic comparative advantage of Korea (i.e., low wages) than t o  subsidized 
interest rates” (Hong 1981, 382). It is clear from Hong’s analysis that, if any- 
thing, the labor-intensive parts of South Korean industry were discriminated 
against when it came t o  the allocation of capital. 
19. The difference between U.S. f.0.b. and c.i.f. clothing prices from Hong 
Kong is around 7 percent. 
20. Hufbauer and Schott (1985) and Hufbauer, Berliner, and Kimberly (1986). 
21. An exception, in addition to  steel, is the less important Canadian global 
import quota on  footwear. 
22. Because of tariff preferences like the General System of Preferences 
(GSP), the tariff on goods originating in Europe is not necessarily the same as 
the tariff on goods originating in LDCs. 
23. Portugal has been a member of EFTA since its formation on 4 January 
1960. The VERs on Portugal imposed by other EFTA members was against 
Article I 1  of the EFTA charter, which forbids all quantitative trade restrictions 
after 3 1 December 1961. 
24. ISIC groups 311, 313, 314, 323, 331, 332, 372, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 
and 390 combined. 
25. The United States restricts imports of textiles and clothing from Japan. 
26. It would be desirable in future research to identify precisely the restricted 
categories. As of today, there are no production data on a tariff line-commodity 
classification. 
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Comment Juergen B. Donges 
Hamilton has developed an interesting method for estimating tariff 
equivalents of VERs. Direct international price comparisons may have 
been preferred, but they are difficult to make because of lack of data 
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in most cases; moreover, there is always the tricky question of how to 
purge consumer prices, if they are available, from transport costs, 
handling margins, taxes, and the like. Therefore, any attempt to im- 
prove on reduced-information methods in this field is useful and 
stimulating. 
The order of magnitude of restrictiveness that Hamilton finds for 
VERs on clothing is quite plausible, though for the EC his implicit 
tariffs are somewhat lower than those reported elsewhere (including 
several studies which have been done at the Kiel Institute of World 
Economics). The estimates on the recent income accruing to the ex- 
porting countries by means of VERs also look sensible. For the sake 
of comparison, these rents should be expressed as a percentage of GDP 
or export value. I submit that they are important in relative terms, 
which is one explanation for the fact that exporting countries do not 
forcefully oppose VERs. I would like to add that in the case of the 
EC, various member states have requested time and again (temporary) 
exclusion from the common external tariff (invoking Article 115 of the 
Treaty of Rome). Textiles and clothing account for the lion’s share of 
all exemptions granted. This could mean that the tariff-cum-NTB de- 
gree of restrictiveness in individual countries might be higher than 
measured in this paper. 
Another fascinating topic is the international transmission of pro- 
tectionist policies. Hamilton puts his finger on a key attribute of the 
present protectionist system, namely that individual countries do not 
protect, but rather groups of countries protect. Leaving aside only 
agriculture, EC protection exists in a number of tiers: one against the 
developing countries; one against Japan, the United States, and a few 
other industrial countries; one against the centrally planned economies; 
and one tier encompassing a free trade area with EFTA. 
Thus Hamilton correctly perceives the results of raising nontariff 
barriers against some countries only as indirect trade deflection. This 
could tend to mitigate the effects of new trade barriers after a change 
in comparative advantage within such a quasi-customs union. For in- 
stance, the costs of protection associated with the U.S.-Japanese VER 
in automobiles should be lower than suggested by standard theory for 
just this reason: U.S. small car imports can be diverted from Japan to 
Europe. 
Be that as it may, further research on the transmission of protec- 
tionism among trading partners is extremely welcome. In particular, I 
wonder how sensitive the findings are to assumptions on supply elas- 
ticities in the new lost-cost producers. It should also be interesting to 
disentangle trade flows across the North Atlantic trade at least with 
regard to clothing and textiles in order to capture more fully the trade 
effects of the MFA within the EC. 
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It is true that indirect trade deflection illustrates that VERs (as other 
NTBs) are not watertight. This may reduce their restrictiveness in 
particular cases. And yet, they create a sort of policy-induced uncer- 
tainty. This worries me because it may easily become a source of export 
pessimism in developing countries and it tempts them to embark upon, 
or continue with, an excessive import substitution (in spite of the sub- 
stantial distortions and the notably growth-retarding effects which this 
strategy usually generates). 
As to Tarr’s paper,* it persuasively shows what other studies also 
have portrayed, namely that government intervention in favor of a 
particular sector does not resolve perennial structural adjustment prob- 
lems of declining industries. It is just an illusion to believe that pro- 
tection by itself transforms underlying comparative cost disadvantages 
into advantages. On the contrary, the so-called “breathing spaces” 
reduce the incentive to adjust in an efficient manner, especially if we 
deal with an industry such as the iron and steel industry, which the 
general public may want to see shielded from imports at any rate; 
survival is perceived as necessary also for noneconomic reasons (e.g., 
for national defense, as a symbol of strength). The futility of sector- 
specific protectionist measures explains why so many NTBs that were 
at one time announced as temporary have endured over time, and not 
only in steel. 
I share Tarr’s sceptical view on the EC’s steel policy (initiated in 
1977). Incidentally, three years before, the Kiel Institute had already 
published a comprehensive study that showed that steel production in 
traditional locations (such as the United States, EC, Germany) was 
bound to come under increasing adjustment pressures from Japan and 
several NICs (Wolter 1974). In addition to the reasons given in Tarr’s 
paper I would like to add two observations: 
First, subsidies to inefficient steel mills are of little help even if these 
mills use them to modernize their production capacity and to diversify 
activities, because these options are also open to the more efficient 
steelmakers (which are in a much better financial position to carry out 
the investment). 
Second, as the decision on the allocation of production quotas across 
the Community has become a political issue (much influenced by pres- 
sure groups from structurally weak regions in which steel production 
is concentrated), the quotas are typically set up too high. This makes 
the process of cutting down capacity even more troublesome, partic- 
ularly so if it affects capacity which was created through modernization 
(nobody wants to write off costly investment immediately after it is 
undertaken). Incidentally, there is an incentive for firms to invest today 
in excessive capacities in order to get a higher quota tomorrow. 
*Chapter 7 in this volume. 
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As to the EC’s code on national subsidies of 1981, it is worth recalling 
that it blatantly violates Article 4 of the ECCS founding Treaty of Paris 
which explicitly forbids all kinds of national subsidies in member states 
and that it runs counter to Articles 2 and 3 of that treaty which call 
for efficiency in steel production and openness in trade among member 
states and vis-a-vis third countries as well. The language used in that 
code to define the conditions under which a steel mill qualifies for 
subsidies at first glance sounds sensible and progressive. But, in fact, 
a strange set of rules has been set up which allows governments to go 
ahead with distorting subsidization. The subsidy was to expire at the 
end of 1985. In December 1985 the Council of Ministers decided to 
extend the code until 1990. Any similarity of European steel policy 
with the history of the Common Agricultural Policy, or with that of the 
Multifibre Arrangement, is purely coincidental! 
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